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Efects

how resultsfromIowamay
his articleexplores
nomination
con
affect
outcomesinsubsequent

inanelectoral
information
aboutcandidate's
district,
strength
inrecent
Somevot
opinionpolls,orothersources.
standing

tests.We suggest thathow Iowa matters may be
determined, at least in part, by how voters and
thenewsmedia assess whether or not candidates

ers areknown toadjust vote intentionsstrategicallyin response

etal.1992).Sup
from
opinionpolls(Johnston
toinformation

portersof candidates or parties at themargins ofviabilitymay

to,information
attentive
to,and responsive
be particularly
there.
meetorexceedexpectations
votersalsoutilize
elections
opinionpolls.Innomination
nominationcontestsare rather from
Americanpresidential
eventstoadjusttheir
voting
from
earlyelectoral
information
unique in that theymake use of a sequential election process
ofviability
inresponsetochangesinperceptions
haveinformationintentions
inlatercontests
wherevotersparticipating
Bartels1985).2
Use ofsuchinformation
the (Abramson
etal.1992;
Scholarsrecognize
of earliercontests.
abouttheresults
thatthissequentialvotinghas on infor may be one process thatgeneratesmomentum. Scholars are
potentialeffects
itreflects
mationusedbyvoters(MortonandWilliams2001).These dividedas towhatmomentumreallyis-whether
elections are also characterized by the fact that theyare intra
partisan, or de factonon-partisan contests.Thus, voters select
froma number of candidates within a party.This lowers the

learningor rational or irrationalbehavior (Mutz 1997;Bartels
1988; Brady and Johnston1987). That said, theprimaryway of
learning about candidate viability is likely to be themass

with no incumbent remove the twodominant vote cues (party

EARLY VOTING AND EXPECTATIONS

forvotersto media.
acrosscandidates
rangeofpolicydifferentiation
Nomination
contests
majordecisioncues.
assessandremoves

rely
uponincandidate These strands of literatureallow us to understand how, and
thatvotersregularly
andincumbency)
In thisregard,
elections
may why, early election events have criticaleffectson the finalout
nomination
presidential
contests.
nomination
how
contests.
Specifically,
choice comesinpresidential
multi-candidate
low-information
be seenas a relatively
settingwhere votersmust relyupon readily available cues'

(andwhy) do the Iowa caucuses and New Hampshire primary

1998).

these two states play a trivialdirect role in allocating conven

policies or general likeability),but also by expectations about
a candidate's chances of success.Voters and donorsmay assess
candidates in termsof expectations about theirprospects for

We propose amodel of outcomes where early eventsmat
ter,inpart,because news about outcomes in these states serve
as amajor source of informationabout candidate viability in a

tings (fora reviewseeCox 1997). For example,we have evidence
fromelections inCanada, Great Britain,New Zealand, Japan,
and elsewhere that some votersmay defect from theirmost
preferredchoice and vote for a lower-ranked option if they
perceive their firstoption has little chance ofwinning (Cain
1978; Blais and Nadeau 1996;Karp et al. 2002).
One causal mechanism driving this is voter response to
informationabout a candidate's electoral prospects. This can
come in the form of information about a party's historic

latterhas been noted elsewhere (Brady and Johnston 1987).
In thismodel, the role of themedia can be seen as somewhat
analogous to theprocesswhere share-marketanalysts set cor
porate earnings expectations. In sharemarkets, when a firm
exceeds itsearnings expectations, its share pricemay rise. If it
fails tomeet expectations, its share pricemay fall.Likewise,
more media attentionmay be earned by candidateswho exceed
expectations. Those who fall short of expectations may see
theirshare of news coverage shrink.

inthenomination
even
when
results
process,
subsequent
whenmakingdecisions(e.g.,Lupia 1994;McDermott1997; affect
how do early events in small
scholarshave recognized
thatchoicesin tion delegates? Put differently,
Furthermore,
insequential
tocandidate
nom
momentum
settings statescontribute
andotherelectoral
contests
presidential-nomination
ination
contests?
may be affectedby preferencesforcandidates (based eitheron

Earlynomination
low-information
choicesetting.
forbeingelectedin relatively
their
prospects
winningthenomination,
to
media attention
(relative
disproportionate
1989;Abramsonet al. eventsreceive
Abramowitz
November,
orboth (e.g.,
literature their share of delegates), and much of thatmedia attention
cross-national
1992;
Mutz 1995).Thereisalsoa rich,
or sophisti relates toexpectations about a candidate's performancein early
evidenceof strategic
thatprovidessystematic
choiceset contests. The formerclaim here is uncontroversial, and the
catedvotinginmanymulti-party
(multi-candidate)
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This model also grants themedia substantial discretion in

ous primarychallenges (Gerald Ford in 1976 and JimmyCarter

setting
andadjusting
expectations.
Reporters,
editors,
andpun in 1980)are included,
whileotherincumbents
who lacked
ditsdefinethecriteria
fordetermining
whethera candidate serious challenge (GeorgeH.W. Bush in 1992,Bill Clinton in
scored an "easywin," managed an "upset,"was "farbehind,"

inframing
orsuffered
"defeat."
Thereissubstantial
discretion

1996, and George W. Bush in 2004) are excluded.5

whether 25% is a "Comfortable Second" (Bill Clinton inNew
Hampshire in 1992), or 23% is a "Strong Second" (Pat Bucha
nan in Iowa in 1992); or if 26% is a "Flat Tire" (Bob Dole in

MODELING EXPECTATIONS

the candidate pool-with a substantial proportion of coverage
focusingon who the frontrunnersare expected tobe,who the
underdogs are, and who beats or fails tomeet expectations.
Initially, the decision to even reporton one particular candi
date ratherthananother,and theamount of attentiongranted,
can be seen as the expression ofmedia expectations.We can
assume thatcandidates who are not expected tobe players in
a contestwill receive lessmedia attention-if forno other rea
son thanmedia resources (column inches,minutes of news
time, etc.) are finite.Attention must be rationed in favorof
candidates who are expected to place relativelyhigh.
Voters thus receive substantial information about the
media's expectations of candidate viability,and of themedia's

Times stories about Iowa and New Hampshire that ran prior
to voting in each state, and in stories that ran aftervoting.6
We coded mentions of the candidates' names in campaign

Given thatwe have no readily available measure of media

expectations
aboutfront-running
candidates,
wemakeuseof
NewHampshirein1996)or26%isan "Overwhelming
straightforward
Defeat" a relatively
surrogate.
Information
about
(Howard
Dean inNewHampshirein2004).3
media expectations
foreachcandidateis represented
by the
Horseracecoverage
ofcampaignsinvolves
handicapping number of times a candidate's name appeared inNew York

relatedstories,
whilewe omitted
mentionsof candidatesin

stories about governing.We assumed that candidates being

mentioned
mostfrequently
acrossseveral
stories
wereexpected
tobe frontrunners.

Total attention to the Iowa and New Hampshire events is
uneven across time.We measured media attention to individ
ual candidates in amanner that is comparable across timeby
calculating the proportion of all candidate mentions of each
Democrat and each Republican, respectively.Table 1 lists the
top candidates on thismeasure based on New YorkTimes sto
interpretation
ofwhethercandidatesmet expectations, ries that ran twoweeks before Iowa, forboth parties. Thus,
exceeded expectations, or failed tomeet expectations. If some
Table 1 illustrateswho received themost press attention prior
votersmake choices on the basis of expectations about who
to the Iowa caucuses, which we assume to reflectinitial (pre
is viable or electable, election results fromearly contests and
Iowa) media expectations of candidate viability.
We also calculate howmedia attention to these candidates
subsequent changes in themedia's treatmentof candidates
are likely to be a major source of readily available informa
shifted in the days immediately after Iowa and New Hamp
tion forvoters in later contests. Although this argument is
shire,respectively,
bycomparing
initial
pressattention
prior
to voting to attention in articles after resultswere known.
not wholly original, few (if any) studies have estimated out
comes inU.S. presidential nomination contests as a sequen
Table 2 lists the candidates with the largest net changes by
tialprocess that includes adjustments formedia expectations
how often theywere mentioned in stories about Iowa before
thevote, and then after.Table 3 lists the same informationfor
associated with results from initial contests.4 Conventional
accounts of outcomes in nomination contests emphasize the New Hampshire. For example, Pat Robertson was mentioned
role of: (1) candidates' national opinion standings at the start quite infrequentlyin stories about Iowa prior to the1988 vote,
of theprocess, (2) candidates' financial resources at the start, but his proportionate share of references to all GOP candi
and (3) home-state advantages (Norrander 1993). Previous
dates increased by 21 percentage points (fromjust 10% to 31%)
in stories about Iowa published in thedays immediatelyafter
studies do not account forhow themedia sets its expecta
his second-place
finish.
tions,nor have many previous studies considered how alter
ations in themedia's attention to a candidate because of an
This measure of change inmedia attention serves as a
early outcome affectthe candidate's prospects in subsequent
surrogatemeasure of how media expectations of candidate
contests.
viability adjust after Iowa votes. Prior to the result of the
1988 Iowa caucus, expectations (and attention) forDole, Bush,
DATA
and Kemp were higher; after Iowa caucused, expectations
Data fromnomination contests from 1976 to 2008 are used
about Robertson shifted,and he enjoyed greatermedia atten
tomodel initial press attention to candidates, candidate per
tionprior toNew Hampshire. As another example, Gary Hart
formance in Iowa and New Hampshire, and aggregate perfor
received relatively littlenotice prior to Iowa (10% of Demo
cratic candidate mentions in 1984). However, afterposting a
mance, respectively. These data include Gallup opinion
measures of each candidate's national poll standing prior to
surprisingsecond-place finishin Iowa (with just 16%,32 points
the Iowa event, and measures of candidate fundraising in the behindWalter Mondale), his share ofmedia attention inpost
result coverage of Iowa more than doubled (increasing from
year prior to the firstnomination event (Iowa). Measures of
national media attention to candidates include attention to
9% to 19% overall), while Mondale's share of press attention
candidates twoweeks before and the days immediately after declined relative to that given his rivals.Hart's 1984 victory
in New Hampshire corresponded with another 27% bounce
the Iowa caucus, and theweek prior and immediate days

Buchananenjoyeda similar
aftertheNewHampshireprimary.
A totalof91 candidacies inattention;
phenomenon
after
are in thedataset.Two incumbent
presidents
who had seri collectinga mere 22,000Iowa caucusvotes in a surprise
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Table

1

Table

Most Frequently
Mentioned Candidates
in Iowa Stories (Pre-caucus)
DEMOCRAT
1976

1980

1984

1988

Carter

2000

2008

BIGGEST
GAIN

(.48)

Baker,1980

BIGGEST
LOSS
+7%

Mondale,1984

-7%

(.10)

1988
Gephardt,

+7%

McCain,2008

-8%

Carter

(.60)

Regan

(.34)

Forbes,2000

+8%

McCain,2000

-8%

Kennedy

(.30)

Bush

(.31)

Harris,1976

+9%

Kemp,1988

-8%

Connelly

(.11)

Kerry,
2004

+9%

Dole,1988

-8%

(.43)

n/a

H.Clinton,
2008

+9%

Gephardt,
2004

-8%

+9%

McCain,2008

-8%

Glenn

(.20)

Keyes,2000

Askew

(.10)

Hart,1984

+10%

Humphrey,
1976

-9%

(.31)

Dole

(.42)

Reagan,1976

+12%

G. H.W.Bush,1988

-9%

(.21)

Bush

(.27)

Tsongas,1992

+15%

Gephart,2004

-10%

Buchanan,1996

+17%

Ford1976

-12%

+17%

G. W. Bush, 2000

-18%

+21%

Forbes,1996

-19%

Gephardt
Simon

(.19)

Kemp

Harkin

(.71)

n/a

Bradley

Dean

(.15)

Obama,

Forbes

(.40)

Huckabee,2008

+21%

Edwards,
2008

-21%

B.Clinton,
1992

+24%

1992
Harkin,

-39%

Dole

(.22)

Gramm

(.13)

(.54)

Bush

(.55)

(.46)

Forbes

(.22)

McCain

(.15)

(.47)

Gephardt

(.19)

Kerry

(.14)

Edwards

2008

Robertson1988

(.11)

n/a

Gore

2004

(.52)

Udall

Mondale

Ford

in Press Attention to

(.16)

Clinton
1996

REPUBLICAN
Reagan

Largest Change

Candidate: 1976-2008;BeforeandAfter
theIowa Caucus

Bayh

Dukakis
1992

(.24)

2

n/a

(.33)

Romney

(.36)

Obama

(.28)

Huckabee

(.29)

Clinton

(.28)

McCain

(.15)

Note: Cell entriesare thecandidate's proportionateshare of all candidate
mentions, per party.

second-place finish in 1996. In termsof beating initialmedia
expectations, Hart (1984, 37%),Reagan (1976, 36%), B. Clin
ton (1992, 35%), Buchanan (1996, 28%), Tsongas (1992, 23%),
Carter (1976, 20%), Huckabee (2008, 19%),H. Clinton (2008,
18%), Gore (2000, 17%),Kerry (2004, 17%),Robertson (1988,
17%), and Obama (2008, 16%) rank highest in the net gain
in attention from before Iowa to immediately afterNew

Hampshire.7
How then,
areinitial
mediaexpectations
set,andhowmight
they
predict
votinginearlyevents?
More important,
howdo
changesinexpectations
produced
by theIowaresults
affect
votingina subsequent
nominating
event(NewHampshire)?8
Conventional
wisdomand logicsuggestseveralfactors
that
drivethepresstogivesomecandidates
moreearlyattention:
fundraising,
poll standing,incumbency,9
and home-state

Table

3

LargestChange inPressAttentionto
Candidate: 1976-2008;BeforeandAfter
theNew HampshirePrimary.
BIGGEST
GAIN

BIGGEST
LOSS

H.Clinton,
2008

+8%

Brown,1980

-7%

2004
Kerry,

+8%

1992
Harkin,

-7%

Udall,1976

+8%

1980
Kennedy,

-8%

Dole,1988

+9%

McCain,2008

-9%

G.W.Bush,2000

+9%

Bush,1992

-9%

Buchanan,1992

+9%

Gephardt,1988

-9%

Gore,2000

+10%

Clark,2004

-9%

Buchanan,1996

+11%

Forbes,1996

-9%

B.Clinton,
1992

+11%

Glenn,1984

-10%

Paul,2008

+12%

Bradley,
2000

-10%

Carter, 1976

+16%

B. Kerry, 1992

-11%

Carter,1980

+16%

J.Jackson,
1984

-12%

Reagan,1980

+17%

Shriver,
1976

-12%

McCain,2000

+19%

Simon,1988

-12%

Reagan,1976

+24%

Forbes,2000

-21%

Hart,1984

+27%

Ford,1976

-24%

Note: Percent change incandidate's share of referencesamong candidates
fromthe same party.
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Estimates ofMedia Attention to Iowa
Candidates 1976-2008, Pre-caucus
Pre-lowa National

poll %

(Gallup)

.56

(.09)

Fundraising (millions of $)

.22

(.08)
Incumbent
Home State

22.9
(10.9)

(Harkin)

69.6

(10.9)
Constant

-.38

(3.4)
R2=

.68

AdjustedR2 =

.63

N = 91
Note: Dependent variable equals percent of all referencesto candidate. OLS
coefficientsreported,
witherrors inparentheses.Allmodels estimatedwithdum
mies for1976,1980,1984,1988,1992,1996.2000.
and 2008 (coefficients
not reported).

...............................................

Process

media attention.Part of press coverage likely involves setting
expectations by interpretingifa less-knownbutwell-financed
candidate is deserving of as much attention as a well-known
officeholder.Indeed, thesenomination contests are frequented
bywell-financed candidates who gain little tractionwith vot
ers (JohnConnelly, $19million in 1980; JohnGlenn, $11mil
lion in 1984; Phil Gramm, $22.3million in 1996;Rudy Giuliani,
$51million in 2008) and well-financed candidates who were
relativelyunknown quantities early on (Robertson, $24 mil
lion in 1998; Steve Forbes, $20 million in 1996;Mitt Romney,
$74 million in 2008).12What then are thepotential effectsof
media attention/expectations,independent of candidate poll
standing and fundraising?Or, forgettingpretense to causal
arguments,does media attentionpredict something that fund
raising and poll standingmight not?
Table 5 reportsestimates of Iowa caucus results from1976
2008, using thestandard variables included inmodels estimat
ingnomination outcomes (Norrander1993;Mayer 1996; 2003).
When standard forecasting variables are used (column 1),
money and poll standing appear tohave substantial power to
predict results in Iowa. In contrast,when press attention to
candidates isused toestimate results,theeffectsofmoney are
eliminated, and theeffectsof poll standing disappeared (when
vote percent ismodeled-but notwhen place of candidate fin
ish is estimated). The Iowa vote share is also estimated here
with an instrumental variable, where press attention pre
dicted from themodel reported inTable 4 is used to predict
the Iowa vote share. Again, we see that press coverage of a

advantages.1oWe expect candidates who raisedmore money
prior to Iowa, thosewith higher national poll standings, those
fromIowa, and incumbents to receivemore initialmedia atten
tion.We measured campaign
fundraisingas totalfunds raised
Table 5
the year prior to Iowa in terms
Estimating Iowa Caucus Results, 1976-2008
of inflation-adjusted (to 2000)
dollars. These factors are used
VOTE
PERCENT
to estimate a candidate's share
Pre-lowa
Media
Attention
.76
.79
(proportionately) of total news
(.09)
(.06)
mentions of candidate names
prior to Iowa.Although some of
Predicted Pre-lowa Attention
.79
these items arewell correlated,
(instrument fromTable 4)+
(.12)
thecorrelationsare by nomeans
Pre-lowa
NationalPoll%
.49
.06
perfect.l
(Gallup)
(.10)
(.09)
Table 4 reports results of
Fundraising
(millions
of$)
.16
-.01
estimates of candidate share of
(.10)
(.07)
press attention in the weeks
HomeState Iowa
77.5
24.9
22.5
27.2
before Iowa.We find thatabout
(12.3)
(11.4)
(9.7)
(14.4)
70% of variance in candidate
share of press attention (our
Incumbent
President.
8.4
25.7
9.2
7.4
surrogate forexpectations) can
(12.4)
(9.5)
(9.0)
(13)
be explained by fundraising,
Constant
1.4
2.3
2.6
0.9
poll standing, and the two
(3.8)
(2.8)
(4.4)
(1.8)
candidate-specific factors.Each
.77
R2
.60
.78
.61
additional 10% in opinion
.74
Adjusted
R2
.53
.75
.55
standing is associated with 5%
greatermedia attention,and $10
N
91
91
91
76
million adds an additional 4.8%
Note: OLS estimates reported.Allmodels estimatedwith dummies for1976,1980,1984 1988
share.These resultsare not sur
2008 (coefficientsnot reported).
prising, but they do illustrate
+Instrumentgenerated fromTable 4,withoutdummies foryear.
thatmoney and poll numbers
*Same substantive resultswith ordered probit.
are not perfect predictors of
48
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PLACE
(1st= 1)*
-

-.11
(.02)

-

-

-.05

.01

(.02)

(.02)

-.03
(.02)

-.007
(.03)

-3.5
(2.0)

4.3
(2.0)

-1.2

1.4

(2.0)

(1.7)

5.8

5.7

(.64)

(.52)

.35

.59

.25

.51

91

91

1992 1996. 2000. and

......................................................................................................................................
candidate (predictedby thecandidates' fundrais
ing and polling numbers) outperformsmodels
thatuse only polling and finance topredict out
comes in Iowa.How should these resultsbe inter
preted? Why would media attention better
predict (or predict as adequately) as the direct
measures ofmoney and poll status?
Clearly,media attention tocandidates covar
ies with fundraising, and there is no way to
clearlysortout thealternatecausal processes that
may be atwork here.Reporters and editorsmay
be particularly savvy at using information
beyond poll numbers to anticipating who will
succeed in Iowa, and thus directmore of their
attention to those candidates. That said, these
results are consistentwith a process where can
didates who receivemore media attention gain
an electoral advantage beyond that associated
with theirfundraisingand national standing in

opinionpolls.

Table

6

Estimates of New Hampshire
1976-2008

Primary Results,

VOTE
SHARE
.37

.40

.032

(.08)

(.09)

(.022)

Iowa Vote %

Change Media Attention (%)

-

(pre-lowa to post-Iowa)
Pre-lowa National Poll %

(Gallup)
(millions
of$)
Fundraising
From Nearby State

Constant

.25

.23

(.12)

(.33)

.39

.40

.039

(.10)

(.09)

(.025)

.06

.06

.005

(.09)

(.09)

11.3

9.9

(3.8)

(3.8)

INNH+
PLACE
(1=X)

WINNH?*

-.063

(.014)
-.52
(.21)
-.035

(.017)
-.012
(.015)

(.024)
1.6

-1.2

(1.0)

(0.7)

0.8

0.6

-4.1

(3.4)

(3.3)

(1.3)

5.9
(.60)

Iowa's potential effectson nomination con
.52
.65
.63
R2
tests in subsequent states are a more important
.44
.59
.58
AdjustedR2
matter. As good as reporters,editors, and pun
.23
PseudoR2
dits may be at anticipating outcomes in Iowa,
91
91
N
91
91
theyoften find theirinitialexpectationswere off.
One of theprimarypolitical functionsof thenews
Note: Allmodels estimatedwith dummies for1976,1980,1984 1988 1992 1996.2000. and 2004
media is interpretingand framingevents-that
(not reported).
* Logitestimates.
is-defining themeaning of such things as vic
tory,secondplace, or 26%.Expectations are then
+ Same substantive resultsvia ordered probit.
adjusted, with increased attention directed at
candidates who exceeded initial expectations
Iowa. Although there is no relationship between the shift in
(Hart in 1984; Robertson in 1988; Buchanan in 1996;Kerry in
media attention towarda candidate andwinning New Hamp
2004) or were not expected to do well anyway (Bill Clinton
shire,thepotential importanceof themedia bounce coming out
and Paul Tsongas in 1992). Table 6 reports estimates of the
of Iowa on the overall nomination contest should not be
New Hampshire primary results from 1976 to 2008. Candi
underestimated.
date vote shares (and places) are estimated as a functionof
As Table 7 shows, performance in New Hampshire is a
the standard variables (early poll standing, finances, state of
strongpredictorof the aggregate primaryvote (and thus del
residence),with two independent variables representing the
egate share),with Iowa having a more muted effect(depend
potential effectsof Iowa: the candidate's vote share in Iowa
ing on specification).But results inTable 7 demonstrate that
and the change inmedia attention directed at the candidate
change inmedia attention after Iowa, and afterNew Hamp
immediately after Iowa.13Again, the underlying assumption
shire,have important substantive effectson how much sup
here is that some voters opt forcandidates theyexpect to be
port a candidate receives throughout thenomination contest.
more viable, and that theymake use of election results,and
Increased attention to a candidate immediately after Iowa,
themedia's interpretationof results, to assess viability.
and immediatelyafterNew Hampshire, has a significantrela
Results inTable 6, albeit estimatedwith aggregate data, are
tionshipwith increasedvote share across thenomination con
consistent with such a process.We see a robust association
tests.
When Table 5 and Table 6 are considered together,the
between a candidate's performance in Iowa and New Hamp
results suggest thatchanges in news about candidates due to
shire.The Iowa vote share, and the Iowa place of finish (not
results in Iowa affecthow well a candidate does inNew Hamp
shown), are significantpredictorsof theNew Hampshire vote
shire.Candidate performance inNew Hampshire then pro
share, the likelihood ofwinning inNew Hampshire, and the
duces additional adjustments inmedia attention tocandidates
place of finish inNew Hampshire. This resultholds when we
control for thecandidate's fundraisingand initial standing in
(and expectations about viability), and this is associated with
national polls. Independent of these effects,we also see that how well a candidate faresoverall.One need notwin Iowa to
win New Hampshire, nor must one win New Hampshire to
change inmedia attention toward a candidate post-Iowa also
win a nomination (although it clearlyhelps). However, addi
has a significantrelationshipwith support inNew Hampshire.
tivemodels inTable 7 suggest performance in Iowa had less
Candidates likeHart,Robertson,Buchanan, andKerrymayhave
had an additional edge inNew Hampshire because of theshift effecton overall primaryvote share thanperformance inNew
inmedia attention theyeamed from theirsurprise finishes in Hampshire did; but it is important to remember that the
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Table

7

Estimates of Aggregate Primary Vote and
Nomination Outcomes
VOTE
SHARE
.61

.71

.68

(.11)

(.10)

(.11)

-.01

.06

.05

(.17)

(.15)

(.15)

.11

.20

Pre-lowaPollStanding
(Gallup
%)
of$)
Fundraising
(millions
IowaVote%
% Change inMedia
Post-Iowa

(.09)

(.05)

.29
(.15)

.42
(.12)

.39
(.13)

.05
(.06)

.51
-

-

.11
(.15)

21.5

(3.5)
inMedia

Post-New
Hampshire
Constant

19.5

(4.5)
.25

.01

(.13)

(.13)

(.04)

-0.6

-0.9

(3.6)

(3.6)

R2

.79

.84

.84

AdjustedR2

.75

.81

.81

-6.0
(1.6)

.60

R2

N
*

-

(.14)

76

76

76

AND

IMPLICATIONS

This presents an importantquestion, then,about
the role of themedia in setting and shifting
expectations about candidate viability.The anal
ogy here between sharemarket analysts and the
media is obviously imperfect. In themarket,
the analyst sets expectations, and themarket
responds. In thiselection context,we assume the
media sets itsown expectations and thenvoters
and themedia responds to how candidate per
formance matches expectations. But where
share-marketanalysts face repercussions iftheir
analyses are flawed (i.e.,theirclients sufferfinan
cial loss), there is no suchmechanism policing
theaccuracyofmedia analysis.News media have
substantial discretion in definingwho is viable,
and thereare no strong incentives for thepress
to set expectations correctly (if thatwere even

.06

.25

-1.0

DISCUSSION

(.05)

.35

(4.1)

Pseudo

.03

(.08)

(.13)

% Change

.17

(.10)

NewHampshire
Vote%
Won New Hampshire?

bility,with thechange innews attention breath
ingnew lifeinto some candidacies while leaving
others all but forgotten.From 1976-2008, media
expectations about which candidates were via
blewere setbefore Iowa voted. Iowa's resultsthen
WON
led toalteredmedia expectations about who the
NOMINATION?*
frontrunners
were. New Hampshire results fur
.08
theralteredmedia expectations about candidate
(.04)
viability, and these shifts in press attention to
.02
candidates then shaped thecontextvoters faced
in subsequent states.
(.05)

76

possible).

Logitestimates.

News-media interpretationof whether the
same number of votes is a comfortable second
place forone candidate or a crushing defeat for
another,orwhether being a U.S. senator froma
nearby state should be used to discount the importance of
support forone candidate inNew Hampshire (e.g.,Paul Tson
gas in 1992) but not another (e.g.,JohnKerry in 2004), may
combine with interpretationof random moments in early

Note: OLS estimates unless noted otherwise.Allmodels estimatedwithdummies for1976,1980.
1984 1988.1992.1996. and 2000 (not reported).

nomination process is sequential. Success inNew Hampshire
corresponds with earlier electoral success in Iowa and the
media bounce associated with beating expectations in Iowa.
Beating early expectations may determinewhether a candi
dacy ends quickly orwhether it lasts longer.
model inTable 7
We also produced estimates fromthe first
using data from the 1976-2004 elections (omitting 2008) in
order to test how themodel predicted the 2008 outcomes.
These predictions are listed inTable 8. Table 8 illustrates that
themodel performs fairlywell in predicting the overall vote
share for themain candidates, although it under predicts
Obama's andMcCain's vote share.Of course,vote share isnot
the same as winning thenomination. Results inTable 7, and
thepredictions inTable 8, suggest thatamodel based on pre
Iowa poll standing, resultsfromtheearliest contests,and shift
ingmedia attention do a good job explaining a candidate's
vote share (which corresponds highlywith how long a candi
date remains in the contest). These results also demonstrate
thatsuchmodels have less utility indistinguishingwhich can
didates actuallywin.
Nomination contests are sequential. This sets the stage for
early events tohave importanteffectsthatcascade over time.
Early resultscan altermedia assessments of a candidate's via
50
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Table

8

Actual and predicted2008Results,From
Table 7,Column 1
ACTUAL

PREDICTED

Republicans
McCain

47.2

41.5

Huckabee

20.1

25.3

Romney

21.7

23.4

Giuliani

2.8

12.1

Obama

48.3

42.6

Clinton

47.1

47.4

Edwards

2.7

8.6

Democrats

* January 2009
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voterperceptions
ofcandidate
states to amplify the effects that these early states have by
viability,
was driven
bymedia
viability
insubsequent discretion,
notbypartyrules.
altering
massperceptions
ofcandidate
inthispapercannotaccountforsuch
It is probably impossible to saywhat the "correct"news
states.
Models reported
stories
aboutexpectations
andcandidate
effects.But as an extreme example of an Iowa event having
viability
should
have
effects inNew Hampshire, and on the eventual nomination

been in these cases, orwhat they should be in any year. The

in Iowa. The informationflow fromIowa toNew Hampshire
was not simply thatDean placed thirdand failed tomeet expec
tationsand thatKerry became more viable (and receivedmore
attention). A CNN poll conducted prior to theNew Hamp
shire primary estimated that 90% of respondents in New
Hampshire saw or heard the speech before theyvoted; 48%
saw or heard it at least six times,with many saying theysaw
or heard it at least a dozen times.14Events such as Dean's
"scream,"Muskie's "crying,"Reagan's "I paid for thismicro
phone," or Bill and Hillary Clinton being anointed "come

about viability in the formof press attention granted to some
candidates and attentiondenied toothers.The American news

outcome,
consider
HowardDean's 2004caucus-night
speech pointis thatoutcomesinearlycontests
generate
information
mediadoesnothaveconsistent
criteria
how
fordetermining
outcomes in early contests should be interpreted.Iowa is par
ticularlyproblematic. Iowa has an arcane and non-transparent
caucus process that, as a result of non-transparency,may

increase
media influence
overtheflowof information
about

candidate viability.The lack of transparencyfacilitatesdiscre
tion in interpretationof events, and may furtheramplify the
effectmedia has (unintentionally or not) on changing the

backkids"inNewHampshire
combine
withinterpretation
of courseofelections
ofcandidate
byaffecting
perceptions
via
objectiveoutcomesto affect
whichcandidatesremain(or bility on thebasis of a very small number of votes.
A two-candidate
become more) viable tovoters in the remaining contests.
contest
betweenan allegedfrontrunner
Inshort,
thesequential
nomination
process
placessubstan and a surprisingopponent is a hard story for reporters,edi

tial discretionwith the news. The media's response tomar
gins of a handful of votes in early states-and interpretation
aboutwhether someone exceeded expectations based on nar
rowmargins-may be enough to leave a better-financed (or
simplybetter) candidate stuck in thirdplace with no percep
tion of viability.Consider the fate of Lamar Alexander, and
themedia bounce that culturewarrior Pat Buchanan enjoyed
afterIowa in 1996. It ispossible thatBuchanan was unelectable.
Yet Buchanan beat Alexander by a scant 5,ooo votes to secure
a surprise second place in Iowa. The media boost associated
with thatmay have helped Buchanan beat Dole (by a mere
2,000 votes) and Alexander (by g,ooo votes, 18% to 23%) in
New Hampshire. A few thousand votes in Iowa was the dif
ferencebetween a headline-grabbing second versus a curious
third-placefinishforBuchanan, and itmay have doomed Alex
ander. Increasedmedia attention afterIowa propelled Bucha
nan toNew Hampshire, and New Hampshire drove media
attention away fromAlexander.
Or consider the fateofWesley Clark's candidacy in 2004.
Clark opted to ignore Iowa. He placed third inNew Hamp
shireon January27, just ahead ofEdwards (and behind Dean
and Kerry). The next nomination event deemed most worthy
of reportingon was the South Carolina primary on Febru
ary 3.Edwards, being born there,was expected todo well, and
he did,winning 45% to 30% over Kerry.That was Edwards's
onlywin in the seven contests conducted thatday, along with
two second-place finishes.Clark won one (Oklahoma), placed
second in three states (Arizona, New Mexico, and North
Dakota), and beat Edwards inmost February3 states.Yetmedia

tors,and producers to resist because it is an easy story.It is
easy, and more exciting, to report that a candidate had a sur
prise second place or that someone failed tomeet expecta
tions than to explain how Iowa actuallyworks. The realityof
Iowa-for Democrats at least-is that actual voter support for

isnotreported
candidates
and thestatewide
apportionment

of precinct-leveldelegates has everything to do with general
election results fromprevious years and nothing to do with
howmany people show up tovote at theprecinctnominating
caucuses. There is a weak linkbetween the aggregate support
a candidate receives across all the precinct caucuses and the
delegate totals elected to the county level thatmedia outlets
use to reporthow a candidate placed. In a close contest, it is
possible that a candidate who mobilizes new voters and/or
has strong support in certain areas will receive themost first
preferencevotes across all precinctsbut place second or third
in the tallyof delegates selected forthe county conventions.'5
But theremust be a story,and in it,someone must win, place,
and show; and the storywill likely be that someone met,
exceeded, or failed tomeet media expectations. v

NOTES

began towane immediately
attention
toClarkhad already
EdwardsinNewHamp
after
NewHampshire.
Despitebeating
shire,
andonFebruary
3,thenewsmedia focus
was onSouth
Carolina,
andonEdwards.
In2004andother
years,
newsexpec
tations
werebased on Iowa,New Hampshire,and South
Carolina-notNewMexico,Oklahoma,andArizona.Clark
wrongstates,inthe
didn'tcontest
Iowa,andhedidwell inthe
wrongtimezones.Thedisproportionate
attention
directed
at
SouthCarolinain2004,and theeffects
itmayhavehad on

i.

In ballot-measure voting, cues may be endorsements and information
about proponents and opponents of a measure. Race, gender, and associ
ation with salient politician and social groups may also serve as cues in
candidate contests.

2. Bartels (1985) demonstrates that candidate
are
preferences
stronglypro
so the
jected onto expectations,
relationship is reciprocal, and that the
effectsof expectations depend on whether a contest is close or not.
3. These phrases are taken fromNew York Times headlines. Dean's 26%
was a
"Overwhelming Defeat"
second-place showing inNew Hampshire,
12% behind Kerry in 2004. Clinton's 25% "comfortable second" was 8%
behind Paul Tsongas in 1992.
4. Morton andWilliams (2001) employ laboratory experiments to test their
vs.
hypotheses about simultaneous
sequential elections.Many previous
or nomination
forecastingmodels estimate aggregate primary vote share
outcome as a simultaneous election eitherwith (Adkins and Dowdle
2001) orwithout (Mayer 1996; 2003) accounting New Hampshire as part
of an additive model, and most omit Iowa.
5. Substantive results are unaffectedwhen sittingpresidents are omitted.
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6. Double counting of storieswas avoided by coding post-Iowa storieswith -.
Iowa bylines or headlines as Iowa content, and pre-New Hampshire
storieswith New Hampshire bylines and/or headlines as New Hamp
shire content.
7. The value forB. Clinton is inflatedby limited initial attention to Iowa
that largely focused on Tom Harkin. Harkin had the largest decline in
share of press attention (-47%), followed by Ford (1976, -36%), Edwards
(2008, -28%), Forbes (1996, -27%), and Bradley (2000, -17%).

Cain, Bruce. 1978. "StrategicVoting in Britain." American Journal ofPolitical
Science 22: 639-55.
Cox, Gary. 1997.Malting Votes Count: StrategicCoordination in theWorld's Elec
toralSystems.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Johnston,Richard, Andre Biais, Henry E. Brady, and Jean Crete. 1992. Letting
thePeople Decide: Dynamics of a Canadian Election. Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.

9. Ford in 1976; Carter in 1980.
10. This is limited toTom Harkin of Iowa, who ran in 1992.

JackVowles, Susan Banducci, and Todd Donovan. 2002. "Strate
Karp, Jeffery,
gic Voting, Party Activity, and Candidate Effects:Testing Explanations for
21:
Split Voting inNew Zealand's New Mixed System." Electoral Studies
1-22.

11. The correlation between
proportion ofmentions and poll strength is
0.68; mentions and money is 0.53; the correlation between money and
poll strength is 0.58.
12. Values here converted to year 2000 dollars.

Lupia, Arthur. 1994. "Shortcuts versus Encyclopedias." American Political
Science Review 88 (March): 63-76.

13. Recall that these variables are not well correlatedwith each other.
14. www.usatoday.com/news/polls/tables/live/2004-01-25-poll-results.htm
15. A related phenomenon occurred in the 2008 Nevada precinct caucuses,
where Clinton beat Obama 50% to 45% in a tally of the 10,740 delegates
elected by 117,600 voters to 17 county conventions. The geographic distri -.
bution of support across counties led the state party to acknowledge that
Obama would receivemore national convention delegates than Clinton.
As in Iowa, actual preferences of the 117,000 voters were not reported by
the party.Most outlets reported the state as a Clinton victory.
-.

Abramowitz, Alan. 1989. "Viability,Electability, and Candidate Choice in a
Presidential Primary Election: A Test of Competing Models." Journal of
Politics 51: 977-92.

Bartels, Larry. 1985. "Expectations and Preferences in Presidential Nominat
ingCampaigns." American Political Science Review 79 (September): 804-15.
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Mayer, William G. 1996. "Forecasting Presidential Nominations." In In Pur
suit of theWhite House: How We Choose Our Presidential Nominees, ed.Wil
liam G. Mayer. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House, 44-71.
2003. "Forecasting Presidential Nominations, orMy Model Worked
JustFine, Thank You." PS: Political Science & Politics 36 (April): 153-57.
McDermott, Monika L. 1997. "Voting Cues in Low-Information Elections:
Candidate Gender as a Social InformationVariable in Contemporary
United States Elections." American Journal ofPolitical Science 41: 270-83.
1998. "Race and Gender Cues in Low-Information Elections." Political
Research Quarterly 51: 895-918.
Morton, Rebecca, and Kenneth C.Williams. 2001. Learning byVoting: Sequen
tial Choices inPresidential Primaries and Other Elections. Ann Arbor: Uni
versity ofMichigan Press.

Abramson, Paul, JohnAldrich, Phil Paolino, and David Rhode. 1992. "Sophis
ticatedVoting in the 1988 Presidential Primaries." American Political Sci
enceReview 86 (March): 55-69
Adkins, Randall, and Andrew Dowdle. 2001. "How ImportantAre Iowa and
New Hampshire toWinning Post-Reform Presidential Nominations?"
Political Research Quarterly 54:431-44.

Biais, Andre, and Richard Nadeau. 1996. "Measuring StrategicVoting: a Two
step Procedure." Electoral Studies 15: 39-52.
Brady,Henry E., and Richard Johnston. 1987. "What's thePrimaryMessage:
Horse Race or Issue Journalism?" InMedia andMomentum, ed. G. Orren
and Nelson Polsby. Chatham, NJ: Chatham House.

8. There is clearly a causal morass in arguing that initial press attention
are unique frompure
re
reporting of
simply reflects expectations that
sults. The two are highly correlated.However change inmedia attention
from pre-Iowa to post-Iowa coverage is not well correlatedwith the Iowa
vote (r= -0.22), and change in attention is inversely correlatedwith ini
tial Iowa attention (-0.41).
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